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Introduction: History and Development of the
Court in National Society
The United States Supreme Court
by Professor Laurence H. Tribe*
AM HONORED to participate in this gathering of the Canada-United
States Law Institute. I am also pleased to have the opportunity to
share with you some thoughts on the role of the United States Supreme
Court in our constitutional scheme. I will not be speaking this morning of
the Supreme Court's very important functions with respect to federal
statutory law or federal common law, but only of its function with respect
to the United States Constitution, the supreme body of law to which all
government-federal, state, and local-is bound. The United States Supreme Court's role in the constitutional arena is its most distinctive, and
thus provides the most useful ground for comparative study.
In talking about the Supreme Court's role in constitutional controversy, I will address broad issues. My main concern is not with the
mechanics of constitutional adjudication in the Supreme Court, but with
fundamental and pervasive problems that are posed by such adjudication.
While such problems-for instance, how to maintain legitimacy in relation to the other branches, or how to reconcile conflicting notions of
rights-might seem to render the Court extremely vulnerable to political
control or at least to effective public resistance, the Court has in fact
played an independent pivotal role in American politics by assuming a
paramount role in constitutional adjudication. The problems with which
the Court in this role has had to grapple have potentially great significance for a nation like Canada, whose Supreme Court is likely to be moving gradually toward a larger and more influential role in resolving basic
constitutional disputes.
I would like to begin with a cartoon I saw a number of years ago in
the New Yorker Magazine. It shows two pilgrims leaning over the edge of
what appears to be the Mayflower. Scanning the distant horizon, one says
to the other, "Religious freedom is my immediate goal ... but my longrange plan is to go into real estate." One moral of this rich tale is plain
enough: that seemingly mundane matters of geographical and institutional structure have provided a constitutional matrix within which
America's values and ideals have somehow survived-even if, from time
to time, they have seemed to be submerged. A second moral is that the
nation's constitutional history has largely been a history of tensions between abstract rights and concrete, tangible realities-if you will, between
form and substance.
The United States Supreme Court's complex place in our national
* Professor of Law, Harvard University Law School.
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experience has reflected and has been shaped by each of these binary
themes. As guardian of the institutional and geographical boundaries of
the country's federal system, the Court has significantly structured the
processes through which our aspirations and our concepts of human
rights have been articulated. Sometimes the Court has enforced those
concepts directly, but most often it has simply nourished arrangements of
countervailing power and rules of decision calculated to protect human
rights indirectly, principally by resisting excessive concentration of political authority while avoiding balkanization and fragmentation of the nation's economy. In mediating human rights through what appear to be
sometimes inhuman institutions, the Supreme Court has had to contend
constantly with the duality of form and substance.
The political philosphers from whom the Framers drew much of their
inspiration for the role they assigned to the federal judiciary in general,
and to the United States Supreme Court in particular, could hardly have
predicted the catalytic role that the Court would often play. Montesquieu
said in his Spirit of the Laws that, "of the three powers, the judiciary is
in some measure next to nothing," since the nation's judges are "no more
than the mouth that pronounces the words of the law, mere passive beings incapable of moderating either its force or its rigor." Alexander
Hamilton might have purposely understated the Court's role when he
wrote in FederalistNo. 78 that the federal judiciary would always be the
"least dangerous" branch of government, having "no influence over either
the sword or the purse," and having "neither force nor will but merely
judgment." In fact, "mere" judgment has indeed proved to be a powerful
force in the United States.
It was natural for the framers to think of the proposed Supreme
Court as a relatively unthreatening voice of reason, enforcing the fundamental social compact against less trustworthy but more potent
lawmakers and executives. The idea of judicial review was born in an attempt to oppose the willfulness of the British Crown in the 1600's, an era
when both the Parliament and England's courts were seen as voices of
reason and discoverers of true principle. By the 1780's, legislatures in the
American colonies had fallen quite rudely from the state of grace that
they initially shared with Parliament, appearing to contemporary observers hardly different from the willful executive. By the late 1820's, the
courts too had joined legislatures and executives in the subjective pit of
will and power, at least in the reigning consciousness of the time. The
breathing space between these two great slides-the brief period from
around 1785 to around 1820-provided a uniquely auspicious time in
which to think of the federal judiciary, and especially of the Supreme
Court, as the most logical guardians of our basic political and legal
commitments.
The great struggle since the post-1820 loss of faith in judicial objectivity has been to provide both legal content and political legitimacy to
the exercise of the independent judiciary's countermajoritarian power.
Viewing the Court as the "least dangerous branch" has helped only marginally. The Supreme Court's inability to wield either the sword or the
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purse, to command armies or appropriations, is plain enough; but the
very question is whether and why the Supreme Court's exercise of judicial
review deserves obedience even when the reasons that it gives do not
completely convince. The fact that the Court ultimately lacks the means
either to compel or to procure obedience may comfort some people, but
that fact in itself hardly proves the case for a habit of voluntary submission, or even for the Supreme Court's own assertion of a paramount role
as constitutional expositor.
In any nation, the arguments both for and against the habit of voluntary compliance with judicial supremacy necessarily rest in large part on
an assessment of whether more is likely to be gained than lost, in the long
run, by separating the constitution's enforcement from the discipline of
electoral accountability, and from the process and personnel of policy formation and policy execution. That is not an easy question to answer even
after nearly two centuries of experience. I think that few would today
accept Learned Hand's rather sad assessment that a nation which cares
little enough for liberty to need a judicially-enforced constitution is a nation so far gone that a judicially-enforced constitution cannot save it. But
our relatively salutary experience with judicial review should not lead us
to ignore the limits of judicial power, or the dangers of relying on it too
heavily, or the tensions that have proven inherent in its exercise.
There is, first of all, the almost hackneyed but nonetheless genuine
risk that symbolic victories in the courtroom will sap the will to obtain
deeper and more enduring solutions in the legislative arena. There is also
the risk that politics itself will be impoverished by the assumption that
the Supreme Court will step in and cure any and all constitutional
defects.
Both of these risks have materialized often enough in our history to
be of real concern. And, beyond these risks, I think it would be naive to
overlook the possibility that a constitutional rescue by the Supreme
Court is sometimes part of a deliberate design. The Supreme Court has
been a tempting "fall-guy" for politicians who are eager to tell their constituents that they voted for a measure but who secretly count on the
Supreme Court to strike the measure down. They may thus denounce the
Court as imperial while gaining political credit at home.
Some of the New Deal legislation adopted despite nearly certain
prospect of doom in the Supreme Court in 1935 and 1936 may well have
been of this variety: measures for which the Administration could take
credit-while avoiding the embarrassment of actually seeing it tested in
practice. Simultaneously, the Administration gained a whipping boy, the
"Nine Old Men," in the bargain. One has to recognize that the Supreme
Court is a susceptible target for strategies of precisely this kind.
Recent proposals in Congress for federal tax assistance to parents of
children in private religious schools may represent another such example.
The measures I have seen do not appear likely to survive a constitutional
challenge under settled doctrines of church-state separation. The propo-
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nents of such legislation might well be seeking political credit, simply for
trying, while they would not mind discrediting the Supreme Court for its
anticipated "obstruction."
This strategy has at times backfired. In 1965, the United States Congress responded to a particularly active form of protest against the Viet
Nam War by making draft card burning a federal crime. Some sponsors
of the measure supported it with speeches on the floor of Congress so
hostile to political dissent that one has to wonder whether they were not
trying to have it both ways: sending the voters back home a signal of their
unyielding patriotism while all but inviting the Supreme Court to strike
the law down as thinly disguised political censorship. When the Court in
United States v. O'Brien instead upheld the law against draft-card burning on the ground that it served purely administrative, ideologically neutral purposes, more than a few Congressmen may have been surprised,
and even distressed.
But the Supreme Court serves as a shock absorber, even as a scapegoat, for reasons deeper and more basic than political expedience. It is
the Supreme Court, burdened by a perceived duty to harmonize and reconcile conflicting ideals, that is most often charged with inexcusably betraying fundamental principles, regardless of what the Court does or fails
to do. Choices which would be tolerated as acceptable accommodations in
other branches of the government are regularly denounced, both by Court
dissenters and by outsiders, as unacceptable departures when made by
the Supreme Court. But it is these very accommodations that the "political branches" are least likely to make.
The most controversial of these'accommodations express the most
basic tension in our law and politics between, on the one hand, norms of
formal equality and abstract rights subject to no "trade-off," and, on the
other hand, the realities of social and economic inequality and of abundant rights competing for scarce resources. We are committed in the
United States at the same time to substantive justice--"neutral" rules be
damned-and to the ideal of formal equality. But as Anatole France
knew when he wrote that the majestic "equality" of French law forbade
the rich and the poor alike to beg in the streets and to sleep under the
bridges of Paris, formal ideals do not always yield substantive justice.
Form and substance may be irreconcilable. The Supreme Court is subject
to attack both when it recognizes substance and when it honors form.
When the substantive "reality" principle prevails in the Supreme
Court, it may be attacked from both ends of the political spectrum. It
may be attacked from the right, as when the Court mandates far-reaching
remedies like metropolitan busing to desegregate schools, or permits the
private use of employment preferences for minorities to redress historic
inequity. It may be attacked from the left too, as when the Court refuses
to readjust a state's welfare distribution formulas and procedures in the
name of decency, equality and fairness, recognizing that the end result
may be that finite resources are withheld from the needy.
When the procedural "formalism" principle triumphs in the Supreme
Court, it is again attacked, and also both from the right and from the left.

1980]

HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT

The right has attacked the Court for insisting that the costs of according
subjects of state power full and fair hearings, or of excluding illegally obtained evidence from use in trials are immaterial. The left too has attacked holdings in favor of abstract rights at the alleged expense of substantive justice. Leftist critics attacked the Court's insistence in the early
1900's that minimum wage laws intruded impermissibly on the "liberty"
of employer and employee to bargain as free and equal agents. The left
has likewise attacked the Court's more recent holdings that ceilings on
political spending or bans on corporate advocacy violate the right to
speak or the right to hear, even if such measures in fact reduce the skewing role of economic power in the "free marketplace" of ideas.
It is as though the nation confronted the Court and said, "Heads we
win, tails you lose." Whatever ways it chooses in the unending conflict
between substance and form, the Supreme Court will be said to have betrayed its principled mission.
Much the same is true of the more specific choices the Court must
make in case after case. For upholding a woman's right to end an unwanted pregnancy, the Court was accused of denying the unborn's right
to live. For permitting the government to withhold public funds from
elective abortion while extending such funds to cover childbirth, the
Court was accused of burdening and therefore betraying the impoverished
woman's right to choose. Thus in individual cases as well as in broad
choices of legislative policy, the Court often faces only a void-a fate
likely to confront any similar constitutional tribunal in a nation which,
like our own, has fundamentally irreconcilable values of constitutional dimension, each relevant in every case.
This description does not offer a terribly happy picture. Yet, remarkably, our Supreme Court remains the most esteemed-and, by many criteria, the most successful-branch of the United States Government. Its
opinions continue to provide the primary language through which we habitually envision and describe the exercise of power in American society,
as well as the primary language through which we subject the exercise of
power to criticism and hold it to account. A phrase like "the police
power," which some have said had little more to commend it than alliteration, persists in our discourse and shapes our public debate long after
the "night watchman state" for which the phrase was perfectly suited became obsolete.
Despite the many inherent sources of its profound vulnerability, instances of real defiance of the Supreme Court's judgments remain extremely rare. One colorful episode may help to suggest why. Shortly after
the Supreme Court in Chisholm v. Georgia, awarded damages in 1793,
against the treasury of the state of Georgia in a suit brought by South
Carolina citizens, an outraged Georgia state legislature passed a law stating that any federal marshal or other person seeking to execute the Supreme Court's mandate in that case would "suffer death, without the benefit of clergy, by hanging." Nothing quite so dramatic proved necessary.
Within five years, in 1798, the Constitution had been amended to reverse
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the Supreme Court's assumption that the federal judicial power automatically subjected unconsenting states to citizen suits for damages in federal
court.
On only three other occasions has a Supreme Court interpretation of
the Constitution been nullified by constitutional amendment, a step requiring two-thirds approval in both the House and the Senate followed
by ratification in three-fourths of the states. The first occasion involved
the Supreme Court's ill-fated ruling in 1857 that slaves were not persons
but mere property, a ruling "reversed" in fact by the Civil War and rejected in law by the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. The second
involved the Supreme Court's holding in 1895 that income taxes must be
apportioned according to population among the states, a ruling undone by
the Sixteenth Amendment. The third such occasion involved the Supreme Court's decision in 1968 that Congress cannot lower the voting age
to eighteen in state elections, a decision repudiated by the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment.
The power to correct by amendment, however rarely exercised and
however deliberately difficult to employ, creates in the nation's elected
bodies a checking device whose very availability both restrains the Court
and helps to legitimate its conclusions. Nonetheless, I have no doubt that
factors less tangible and more elusive deserve most of the credit for the
United States Supreme Court's ability to transcend the nearly crippling
limitations of its role. Among the most crucial sources of the Supreme
Court's success is its paradoxical character-at once both a remote oracle
dispensing "miracle, mystery and authority," and a common courthouse
adjudicating ordinary cases and controversies in a forum accessible to all,
dispensing equal justice to everyone. These two images coalesce to make
the Court a unique source of credibility and strength in American society.
Given this paradox, it seems fitting that the decision setting our Supreme Court on its enduring course was Marbury v. Madison, which at
once declared the Court's authority to act as supreme constitutional interpreter and denied the Court's authority to dispense relief in the particular case before it. William Marbury had claimed a right to fill the post to
which outgoing President John Adams had appointed him. The Court
opened its doors to Marbury, only to shut them again upon concluding
that it lacked authority to grant him the relief he sought against the new
President, Thomas Jefferson, and his Secretary of State, James Madison.
That the Court could order the Executive to obey the Constitution was
clear, Chief Justice John Marshall said, but only in a case properly within
the Court's jurisdiction. Writing for the Court, Marshall held that Congress' attempt to confer jurisdiction upon the Court in cases such as Marbury's was void because it violated Article III of the Constitution-as
construed by the Court itself.
The Court in 1803 thus assumed for itself the power to decide
whether Congress had violated the Constitution. It also assumed the
power to order the Executive to respect rights found by the Court to be
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vested-pursuant to Acts of Congress or otherwise. The Court assumed
both of these extraordinary powers, however, in the process of denying
itself the power to award Marbury any relief against Madison.
Nearly 175 years later, in the Pentagon Papers case, the Supreme
Court with equal deftness would deny itself and all federal courts the
authority to perform the "executive" function of maintaining state
secrets. The result of this self-denial, however, was to dissolve the restraint against publication sought by a President, and so to prevent a
President from engaging in prior censorship.
The Court in Marbury v. Madison had renounced and assumed
power in the same breath. It had asserted authority to protect private
rights against even the Chief Executive, while apparently ruling in favor
of the Executive branch. It had opened the courthouse even to the most
mundane of claims and yet had proclaimed the Court's jurisdiction to be
unavailable. And the Court performed each of these feats without doing
violence to constitutional text, history, or logic. It is on such paradoxes
that the Supreme Court has, at its best, built its fortress. It is a fortress
without ramparts, just as the Pope has no divisions. But it is a fortress
that has ably guarded the Constitution.

